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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

UNITED STATES SMELTING
REFINING AND MINING COMPANY,
Respondent,

-vs-

Case No.

PHARES HAYNES, as County
11 reasurer of Tooele County,
a legal subdivision of the
State of Utah,
Appellant,

6931

COMBINFJD Mli-".:TALS lUijDUCTION
COMPANY, a corporation,
Respondent,

-vs-

Case No.

6907

TOOlijLE COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah
and PHARES HAYNES as County
Treasurer of Tooele County.

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
Respondents in the above cases having obtained an
Order from the Court authorizing them to file a consolidated petition for rehearing, appellants have like-
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wise consolidated the cases for the purpose of answering such a petition.
We have carefully read the several arguments relied on by counsel in seeking to obtain a rehearing of
the instant cases, but find nothing therein which was
not before the court and considered by it in rendering
its decision herein. The four grounds set forth in Respondents' brief re-affirm the position taken in previous
briefs filed herein in very similar language. However,
the court has accepted Appellants' theory of the case
as being the proper one. At the risk of duplicating many
of our arguments heretofore submitted to the court, we
shall proceed to answer Respondents' points in the
order set forth in their brief.
However, we deem it necessary to comment on the
"Re-statement of Facts" set forth in the petition for
rehearing before discussing the main issues. On page
4 of petitioners' brief, appears the following statement:
"The (premium payments) were not a part of or in any
manner reflected in or related to any sale or any consideration for a sale or conversion into money of the
ores or metals." This is a conclusion of the petitionersnot a stipulated fact. Nor did thitol court by its opinion
rendered herein reach this conclusion from the stipulated
facts.
On the contrary, appellants have at all times maintained that premium payments were related to the sale
of the ores in question and were made as a part of, and
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in consideration of, such sale. The premium payments
were received by the various mining companies as partial consideration for the ores which they produced. We,
of course, admit that the actual time of payment by
Metals Reserve Company did not coincide with the time
of the payment by the smelting companies on their
smelting contracts, but we opine that petitioners would
not contend that the time of payment was the factor
which determined whether premium payments were or
were not related to the sale or formed a part of the consideration for the sale or conversion of the ores into
money. Such an argument would be ridiculous in the light
of modern time financing where payments for the purchase of goods, wares and merchandise are often postponed and staggered over a long period of time.
As will hereafter appear the entire plan (including
the fixing of ceiling prices and the payment of premiums)
was one of ''differential pricing for the purpose of increasing non-ferrous metals output." See Amici Curiae
brief, Appendix p. 43.
ARGUMENT

I.
THE CONSTRUCTION BY THE COURT OF
SECTION 80-5-57 SO AS TO INCLUDE "PREMIUM
PAYMENTS" AS A PART OF THE "GROSS PROCEEDS'' DOES NOT RENDER SUCH SECTION UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS BEING UNREASONABLE
OR INEQUITABLE.
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In this connection petitioners argue that "to include payments made . . . in gross proceeds is necessarily to hold that the greater the costs of production
the more valuable a mine." This same position was taken
by counsel in their brief heretofore filed, and was fully
answered by the supplemental brief which appellants
filed in this case. Petitioners apparently failed to differentiate between "gross proc<'eds" and "net proceeds.'' As always, the greater the cost of pruduetion,
the smaller will be the net proceeds from the mining
operation. The fact that one mining company receives
greater gt·oss pr oceeds does not in any wiRe indicate that
its n,et proceeds will also be greater. And since the valuation of a mine is based upon its net proceeds in any one
calender year, there can be no justification for the argument that the greater the costs of produdion the more
valuable a mine.
1

\Ve arc apparently all agreed that when the Legislature enacted the "Net Proceeds" statute, it intended
to lay down a practical formula for arriving at the
value of a mine or mining claim. The formula is not
only practical, it is also relatively simple. It requires to
be included on the one hand all monies received by the
mining company-the gross realized-"from the produet of the mine,'' while permitting the mining company
to deduct from such gross proceeds certain ''costs and
expen;:;cs of obtaining such proceeds awl converting the
same into money." Mercur Gold l\[ining & Milling Company v. Spry, 16 Utah 22, 52 P. 382.
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We can think of numerous illustrations where the
application of such a formula would in a given year impose a heavier tax upon a mining company which might
otherwise have less ore reserves. However, the valuation
of a mine is not determined by its ore reserves nor by
the value and extent of its improvements, except as these
factors may be reflected in the annual profit derived
from the operation of the mine. Should a mining company (for the purpose of impressing its stockholders or
for some other reason personal to itself) decide to drain
its ore reserves as much as possible in a given year without at the same time carrying on necessary development
work, and thereby show a large profit from its mining
operation for such year, its valuation for taxation purposes may be considerably higher than a neighboring
mine that may have carried out the policy of conserving
its ore resources to the end that it produced little ore
and showed only a small profit. As a matter of fact, a
mining company which failed to operate its mine at all
during a particular calendar year might have no net
proceeds for valuation purposes. Under such circumstances its mine and mining claims would be assessed at
$5.00 per acre although the value of such mining claims
and mine would far exceed that.
We feel that what has been said by this court on this
subject in its opinion heretofore rendered in these cases
is well reasoned and is supported by ample authority.
This court expressed itself as follows:
''Because one mine, whether because of more
efficient management, better mining equipment,

stoping up for ores as distinguished from hoisting from low levels, shorter hauls, richer ores, or
better smelter contract, has larger net proceeds
per ton of ore mined than has another, mining
the same kinds of metals, does not make the
assessments discriminatory nor does it result in
lack of uniformity. It does result in assessing
one mine at a greater value than the other because it has a greater net return, a greater profit, more dividends, and that is an important item
in the determination of value of mining property."
The argument is again made that because the Legislature could not have known when the statute defining
"net proceeds" was passed that some day the Federal
Government would regulate and control prices of metals,
including the payment of "premiums," it must now
be concluded that such premiums are not a part of the
proceeds reali?Jed ''from the product of the mine.'' As
contended by counsel it is the duty of this court in construing and interpreting legislative acts "to give effect
to the intent of the Legislature and to avoid an interpretation which would lead to an impractical, unfair or unreasonable result. Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98
Utah 70, 97 P. (2d) 937." The court in its opinion in
the present cases determined that the interpretation given
to the statute by the Tax Commission "tends to equalize
and render uniform the tax base and assessment;" that
the interpretation urged by the mining companies would
lead to an impractical, unfair or unreasonable result. We
desire again, at the risk of being repititious to quote
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the definition of "net proceeds" which has been accepted
in this State since 1898 when the case of Mercur Gold
Mining and Milling Company v. Spry, supra, was decided:
''By the term 'net annual proceeds of the
mine' is meant what is annually realized from
the product of the mine, over and above all the
costs and expenses of obtaining such proceeds and
converting the same into money.''
While the statute has been amended from time to
time since that date relative to the deductions permitted
in arriving at "net proceeds" the above definition of
"proceeds" as being "what is annually realized from
the product of the mine'' remains the true criterion.
With such a definition having been made by the court,
the Legislature in 1919 did not need to envisage any
"premium payment" program. It did contemplate that
the proceeds realized or derived from the ores produced
by a mining company, as distinguished from any proceeds which it might receive from developing water,
operating a store or boarding house, would be considered
as part of the ''gross proceeds' 1 and thence into ''net
proceeds' 1 from which the valuation of such mine or
mining claim would be calculated. The legislature used
ordinary, common words to indicate its intent to include
all such proceeds as are received from the ore output.
We do not know how more comprehensive, all-inclusive
language could have been used. It was not necessary,
as contended by the mining companies, to state specifi-
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cally: ''including the Federal Government in the nature
of a subsidy or bonus for operations." (See Brief of
Amici Curiae, page 34.)

II.
THE COUHT DID NOT DISREGARD }IATI-GRIAL F AC'rS STIPULATJ<JD TO B~TWJ1jEN THI-c
PARTIES.
It is true that the parties stipulated that in some instances premium payments ''are made in advance of a
sale of ores or the metals recovered from ores; in other
instances such payments are made after sale of the ores.''
(Schedule "A," p. 23). However, it might just as well
have been stipulated that the purchase price of the ores
was received in two payments, since that actually was
the way it was done. In no instance were premium payments made until the ores had been delivered to the
smelter for smelting or refining, thereby, as stated in
the eourt 's opinion, placing the metals in "such form
that they have a ready market at definite or readily
determinable prices so that at any time the miner can
dispose of them and receive the money therefor." As
such the metals have been converted into the equivalent
of money as defined in the case of Salt Lake County v.
Utah Copper, 93 F. (2d) 127.

'L'ake the situation of the United States Smelting Refining and Mining Company: A copy of an affidavit filed
by that company appears on page 21 of Schedule ''A.''
In that affidavit Mr. F'. S. Mulock as Vice President and
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General Manager of the company states that the company has "produced and delivered to itself and American Smelting and Refining Company at their Custom
Milling-Lead & Copper plants known as Midvale Plant,
Garfield Plant, respectively, . . . during the month of
October, 1943, the quantities of copper, lead, and zinc
hereinafter listed ... That its monthly production quota,
as hereinafter stated, has been filled and the amount of
material specified therein has been produced and delivered for sale during the month above mentioned.''
The instructions given by Metals Reserve Company
to the smelting companies in connection with the latter
acting as agent for the purpose of making premium payments are enlightening on this matter. As set forth at
pages 17A and 17B of Schedule ''A,'' these instructions
read in part as follows:
"During any given month you will settle with
the producers in accordance with your contracts
with them, and pursuant to your usual practice.
Following the end of each month, each producer
will furnish you a sworn affidavit (in the form
of Exhibit" A" hereto attached) showing, among
other things, the amount of each metal (in excess
of his quota for that metal) contained in the
material delivered by him to your works during
the month in question for which (in accordance
with your settlement sheets) he has been paid
the market price and on which he is eligible for
a premium from MRC.
'' MRC will make funds available promptly
to enable you to make the premium payments to
the respective producers, following receipt from
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you monthly by the Traffic Manager of MRC
of (1) a statement setting out the name of each
producer fmm whom excess production has been
b,ought during the month covered by the statement, the total arrvo'l1!nt of metals oontained in
materi-al received during the month for whick
paymen.t has been made or will be made to such
producer, and the amount of such metals which,
being excess production, is eligible for a premium,
and (2) the producers' affidavits ...
"Upon receipt of such funds you will pay to
each producer, on behalf of MRC, as a premium
on his metals in excess of quota, a sum equal
to the difference between the market price (ceiling price) for the respective metals (which will
have theretofore been paid to him by you under
his contract) and the equivalent of seventeen
cents ( 17 c) per pound Connecticut Valley for
eopper, nine and one-fourth cents (91,4c) per
pound New York for lead, and eleven cents (llc)
per pound East St. Louis for zinc.'' (Italics
added.)
As set forth m the table contained on page :n of
the same schedule, in the case of each mining company,
the gross proceeds reported were based on smelter
returns except in the case of Kennecott Copper Corporation, which reports its sales of metal in the open
market. As indicated above, the premium payments
were made on a basis of such smelter returns also.
The court therefore properly concluded that such payments were a part of the gross proceeds received from
the sale or conversion into money or its equivalent of
the ores produced by the respective mining companies.
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An additional factor, not heretofore presented to the
court, which in our opinion sustains the decision rendered, is contained in the Senate Sub-Committee Preliminary Report, pursuant to Senate Resolution 66.
"Rather full extracts are reprinted for the benefit of
the court" in the appendix to the brief of Amici Curiae.
In analyzing the "evolution of the plan" the report
states that considerable price inflation resulted in World
·war I. "In this war, such price inflation was avoided
by differential rJricing techniques." 'rhe report further
states that the premium price plan was "one of the
most successful of theRe techniques". The "differential
pricing" was attained by fixing quotas so that one
mining company would be required to produce more
ore at a given price than another mining company. As
one official stated" 'quota adjustments under the Premium Price Plan constitute a flexible instrument for adjustment of mine revenues so as to enable continuous maximum production in the face of changing circumstances
which occasion changes in cost, unavoidable decline in
grade of ore, wage increases, fluctuations in operations
owing to changes in the manpower situation and the
like'." (See Appendix, page 45).
As the plan developed, property was generally
assigned a quota less than 100% of its 1941 rate of
production ''and the work of the Quota Committee
became almost solely the revision of quotas to meet
changing conditions". In other words, the nature of
the problem involved became the ''calculation of what
might be produced with the given labor supply, what
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that production would cost and what quotas would
yield sufficient revenue to cover the cost and provide
an adequate margin". As we have heretofore pointed
out to the Court even the amount of royalties paid to
leasers by the mining companies in certain instances
included premium payments within the basis of settlement. (See, Maximum Price Regulation 356, Schedule
"B", pp. 39-40.)
The foregoing statements taken from the Senate
report indicate, as do the provisions of the pertinent
statutes, regulations, and proclamations relative to the
"premium price plan" that premium payments were an
integral part of the price structure, and as such should
he included as a part of the gross amount received for
the ores produced by the several mining companies.
III. and IV.

TJUJ PROVISIONS O:F' SEC'riON 81-1-1 AND
80-3-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATI1JD 1D43 ARE NOT
INCONSISTI,JN'r 'VI'JlH THE COUHT 'S DFJCISION
IN THIS ),fATTJ1JR.
Petitioners claim that this court disregarded the
provisions of Reetion 81-1-1 with respect to the definition
of a "sale of g·oods" as being "an agreement whereby
the seller transfers the property in question to the
buyer for a eonsideration called the priee" in construing
the net proeeeds statute so as to include premium payments as a part of the gross amount received from the
sale or eonversion into money or its equivalent of the
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ores produced. As a matter of fact, however, this Section has no application to the issues presented in the
cases before u::;. There is no requirement in the statute
that all of the money received for the goods be paid
at one time or that it be paid entirely by one person.
Respondents here maintain the fact that because
premium payments were made at a different time than
the amounts otherwise received is conclusive that Guch
premium payments were not a part of the gross proC{~eds. Such, of course, is not the law.
As defi1wd in the case of Watson v. Odell, 58 Utah
27G, 198 Pae. 772, a ''sale is ordinarily understood to
mean a transfer of property for money". But, again,
nothing i::; indicated that the entire consideration for
the transfer of the property must come from the transferee or that all of such consideration must be paid
at the time of the transfer.
Section 80-3-1 defines "value" as being "the amount
at which the property would be taken in payment of a
just debt due from a solvent debtor". Mr. Justice
Wolfe, in his concurring opinion in the Occupation Tax
cases, adequately disposes of petitioners' argument
herein as follows :
"Value as meant by the legislature in Sec.
80-5-66 is no longer extant. The only remaining
basis is the money received from the sale and
certainly the money received from the sale is
the total price which the sale yielded regardless
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of whether part of it would ultimately or immediately be paid by the Metals Reserve Company
either directly or indirectly.''
~rhe

definition of value as set forth m the statute
was not ignored by the court, but because of its inapplicability to the circumstances in the present cases it
was not discussed in the main opinion.

v.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISREGARDING THE S'l'ATEMENT 01'' THE PRESIDENT OF
METALS RESERVE COMPANY.
As an indication of the weakness of their position,
m seeking a re-hearing, respondents finally attempt to
jmpose upon this court the opinion of Charles B. Henderson, chairman of Metals Reserve Company, to the
effect that "premium payments made by Metals Reserve
Company are not payments made by that company or
received by the mining company for the sale or conversion into money or its equivalent of any ores.'' On
page 25 of Schedule "A" appears the following stipulation:
"The Mining Companies caused to be prepared and submitted to Metals Reserve Company
a memorandum respecting the inclusion of premium payments in 'net proceeds' and in 'mine
occupation tax'. After examining such memorandum a letter was written by the President of
Metals Reserve Company to Mr. F. S. Mulock.
Such memorandum and letter were, upon proper
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identification, received in evidence by the Commission (but the Commission shall not be bound
by the facts, inferences or oonclusions therein
sta.ted) . . . . " (Italics added.)
We wonder why counsel did not call the court's
attention to the opinion of the Attorney General of
Utah, al~o eontained in Schedule "A" in which the
conclusion is reached that the premium payments made
hy 11 etals Reserve Company are ''payments made by
that Company or received by the mining company for
the sale or conversion into money or its equivalent of
any onler ". Certainly the latter opinion is more persuasin• of nn interpretation of our own taxing statutes.
However, Mr. Henderson himself stated that Metals
Reserve Company "has made no study of the provisions
of the Utah laws relating to taxation of mines, and is
not in a position to express any opinion concerning
statements in the memorandum on that subject". He
thereby appeared quite willing to let our Supreme
Court pass on the interpretation and construction to be
given to our own local taxing statutes. We wish that the
same could he said fm counsel for the various mining
eompanies who have attempted to bind this court by the
decisions of the trial courts, both State and Federal,
all of whieh decisions have been reversed on appeal.
Having fully answered the art,ruments contained m
R.espondents' brief on petition for rehearing, we now
turn to a discussion of the arguments of counsel in the
brief of Amici Curiae filed in these cases as well as
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the "occupation tax cases". As outlined in that brief,
the issues presented for discussion are three-fold:
(a) Whether the premium payments were a part
of the ''gross proceeds'' realized from the sale or
conversion into money or its equivalent o( the ore;:-; mined
by the various mining companies.
(b) Whether the premium payments constitute a
part of the ; 'gross amount received for or tlH' groso:
value of mctallii'erum; orcs sold''.
(c) Whether the prewium payments constitute
"gros::; income" umler thu corporate franchise tax law.
Of course only tl1e fin;t two of these issues are
presented in the easm; on which a rehearing is being
sought by the various mining companie8. 'l'he question
of whether the premium payments constitute ineome has
never been raised insofar a:-; we have been able to
ascertain with respect to any of the partie:-; involved
m the cases pending before the Supreme Court.
In considering the nature of the premium payments,
we eoncur with eounsel that the Federal Government
fixed prices generally and specifically with respect to
copper, lead and zinc. We wish to add, however, that
the Government also fixed the amount of ''premium
payments" which would be made for each pound of
copper produced in excess of quota-quotas also being
fixed by the Federal Government-so that we can say
without equivocation that the entire sums received by
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the rnmmg eompanies from their ore were received by
virtue and under specific regulation of the Federal Government.
On page 7 of their briPf, Amici Curiae refer to
thP f.;pnate Sub-Committee preliminary report which is
printPrl in part in the appendix to the brief commencing
page 4-1. Connscl term the "premium payment plan"
a~ '' ooe of the most mal-administered plans put forth
hy the OovNnment.". This, notwithstanding that the
mining companies participated wholeheartedly in the
program and were recipients of considerable sums of
money from the F(~dpral Government pursuant to such
plan.

On page :n of the Stipulation of Facts referreu to
as Schednlr:> ''A'' will he found the various amounts
received by the mining companies during the calendar
year 104~ from l\f etals Reserve Company. The amount
varie~ from *1,227.85 receiveu by Niagara Mining Company to $~, 781 ,42l.G5 receivPd by Kennecott Copper
Corporation. 'rhf~ total amonnt paid by l\f etals Reserve
Company to the ::;everal Utah mining companies during
that year is $8,212,:i55.94. There has been no eontention
made that ~my mining company was compelled to take
part in the premium payment prngram or to participate
in its hendits. '!'he fact that every mining company
did so is an indication that the plan was well founded
and hronght eonsirlerahlc benefits to the mining industry.
From 1\n·ther remarks eontained on page 7 of their
brief, connsel would have ns believe that sales were
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actually consummated without reference to premium
payments. We again refer to Schedule "A" of the
Stipulation, page 23, to the effect that "in certain
instanc('H premium payments are made in advance of a
sale of orcs or the metals recovered from ores; in
other instances such payments are made after sale
of the ores". This is not a stipulation that the premium
payments have no relationship to the Hale or the purchase price. As heretofore indicated and as shown by
the affidavit of the pro<lncer filed for th<' purpose of
qualifying for premium payments, sucl1 producer states
that the quantitiet; of ore listed "have been produced
and delivered for sale during the month'' mentioned in
the affidavit (See Schedule "A," pages 20, 21 and 22).
As the Schedule recites on page 16:

"17. Payment of premiums is made by
Metals Reserve Company upon the basis of an
affidavit of the producer and a statement by
Metals Reserve Company's desi,t,rnated agent
transmitting such affidavit and in support of the
producer's request for premium payments. Such
affidavit and statement are required to be made
on forms prescribed by Metals Reserve Company
and are as follows : ''
It is :further argued that the case of Park Utah
Mining Company illustrates "that the tmbsidy payments
constitute no part of the sum realized from the sale of
ore or its conversion into money or its equivalent.''
The facts with respect to that mining company are not
'before this court. We are therefore in no position to
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contradict counsel as to those matters. It however
appears from the facts related that the Park Utah
Mining Company received certain B and C premiums and
in consideration of receiving such premiums agreed
to a certain expansion program in its mine. But, the
fact remains that all premiums were paid at a certain
amount per pound for the metal content of the ores
prodnced, and the additional expenses incurred in fulfilling its agreement with the Federal Government were
deducted hy the mining company before arriving at its
net proceeds. Certainly, if the 1\'letals Reserve Company
was willing to increase the purchase price of the ore
extradc>d by the Park Utah mine, such is no concern
of the parties involved in this litigation. Nor do we
see how the Park Utah, if it received a greater amount
for its ores than some other mining company, can complain merely because such additional sum is included in
the gross proceeds. The fact that it agreed to and did
incur additional expenses for development work would
reduce its "net proceeds'' from which its valuation is
determined, since cost and expenses of development work
are deducted from gross proceeds from which a mine's
valuation is determined.
Again, the case of the Kennecott Copper Corpora~
tion is not before this court for determination. However, Amici Curiae argue that as to such mining company subsidy payments "were made not only before a
pnrehaser had appeared for the copper produced but
even hPfore there ltad been brought into existence a
commercial prodnet that was capable of sale".
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vVe recof,rnize that the premium payments were made
before Kennecott Copper Corporation disposed of its
metals, hut before premium payments were made to
Kennecott, its metals had reached the same stage of
processing and refining as in the case of ores extracted
by any other mining company and therefore came within
the purview of the statute as interpreted in Salt Lake
County v. Utah Copper Corporatio11, supra. 'T'he
fact that premium payments were aetually made
before the metals were disposed of is not indicative
that such payments were not related to the sale of such
metals or their value. Opposing counsel are eertainly
aware of the fact in our present economic strucmrfl:
that there are numerous instances where "deposits,"
"pre-payments" or "advances" are made prior to the
sale of a commodity or even its actual production. If
the mining company is paid for the conmtodity and in
consideration of its sale, as appears from the affidavits
filed by the respective mining companies, no complaint
can be injected into the picture that the money was
actually received either before or· after the sale was
consummated.
It is finally concluded at page 10 of amici curiae's
brief that the premium price plan was ''closely tied
in to price fixing during the early days of the plan, but
later evolved to a condition when development and
exploration work which might not result in any production was a basis for the amounts paid". We recognize that the forepart of this conclusion is correct, but
insist that the record does not disclose any change or
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evolution by which the theory of prerrnum payments
was withdrawn from the realm of price fixing. Notwithstanding the affidavits filed by the respective mining
companies recited that the ore containing certain metal
"had heen produced and delivered for sale" counsel
try to argue that such premium payments had no
relationship to a sale or a disposal treated as a sale.
Nor did the court err in determining that the
Federal Government had made no attempt to restrict
the i-)tate of Utah from including the premium payments
in the amounts received by the mining companies from
their ores. Opposing counsel take the position that we
are confronted here with an interpretation of .F'ederal
statutes and that therefore the decision of Judge Johnson on Odnher 80th, 1944, would he hinding upon this
court. Those cases referred to on pages 13 and 14 of
counsel's hrief were finally appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States where they were dismissed
for ]aek of jnri;.;diction on the part of the Federal court
even to consider the merits of the controversy. And
in di;.;cussing the nature of the prohlem involved in
those eases, the Supreme Court made the following
eomment:

''It is to be noted that the cases under conHide ration illustrate the disadvantage of deducing
from equivocal lan6'llage a state's consent to
Huit in the federal courts on causes of action arising 1Lnder state tax statutes. The disadvantage
referred to is that, if the merits were to be
passed upon, the in-itial interpretation of the
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meaning and application of a st1ate statute would
have to be made by a federal court withmd a
previO'us authoritative interpretation of the stat1Ite by the highest court of the stwte. See Spector
Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 103-105,
89 L. ed. 101-103, 65 S. Ct. 152." (Italics added.)
See, Kennecott Copp·er Corporation v. State Tax
Commission, :~27 U. S. fl73, tl6 S. Ct. 74!'"l, 90 I'· P!l. H62.
Again, referenee is made by opposing (':mnsel to
the decision of ,Judg·e Johnson involving th(~ <~pplicaJion
of the net proeeeds tax D.fl ~:peeifically applyin[~ to the
Park Utah Consolidated .Mining Company (hereinbefore
referred to), the Kennecott Copper Corporation and
others. So that counsel conclude "as a matter of law
this court is bound by the Federal Government's construction of its own statute:s and is not free to substitute its own opinion as to their construction." Those
cases referred to have now been decided by the Circuit
Court of Appeals which followed the decision of this
court on the theory that the issue involved was one of
construction of local statutes rather than of Federal
statutes. We quote from the opinion of the Circuit
Court of Appeals as follows:

''One ground of the motions for directed
verdicts for plaintiffs was that in the taxation of
the mines and mining claims, the inclusion of
subsidy · payments in the gross proceeds and
thence in the net proceeds, as a basis for such
taxation, was not authorized by the law of Utah.
That question consumes much space in the briefs
and it was ably presented on oral argument.
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The Supreme Court of Utah quite. recently oonsidered the question and held without qualification
that in the ta:cation of mines and m.ining claims
in that state, premium 'Or subsidy paym.ents of
this kind should be added to twice the amount of
the proceeds received from the sale of the ores
for the preoeding calendar year as the base for
such ta:nation. United States Smelting, Refining
and Mining Co. v. Haynes,- Utah-, 176 Pac.
(2d) 622. At the same time, the court reached
a like conclusion in a case involving a closely
similar question. Combined Metals Reduction Co.
v. State Tax Commission, -Utah-, 176 Pac.
(2d) 614. The question before us is ,essentially
one of Zocal law amd therefore 1these decisions of
the supreme court of the state ~are oontrrolling."
(Italics added.)
1

1

In the face of these decisions from the Circuit
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United
States, we marvel that anyone should suggest either
that the question involved is primarily one of construction of Federal statutes and Regulations or that the
decision of the Federal District court is in any wise
persuasive that this court has erred in its construction
of our local taxing statutes.
Construction of the Utah Statutes:
With the authorities and statements quoted from
various cases by Amici Curiae contained in their brief
at pages 16-25, we have no complaint. The law is well
settled on the subject of statutory construction. However the argument referred to on page 27 to the effect
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that l\;fontmm has determined the point her\~ involved
adversf'ly to what our court has decided it, is not
persuasivP that our court was wrong hut that the Muntana c·ourt :n the easf~ of Klies v. Linnane, lf>G Pac. (2d)
18:3 \Va..., ill wlvised and therefore determined tho question
improperly. Certainly a cursory reading of the opinion
in that case would indieatc that the rceonl nn<l files of
the various Federal Ageneio:s were not hel'or(' the eHurt;
that it was not aware that the Ofliee of Priet> Administration had pm-;~;ed a S}l(~eific rcg·nlation exe.lwling premium paynwnts from the effect of the Prict· Control
Act so that their paym<~nt \\·ould not eonstitutl· n ,.·iolation of the rep;ulation.
Nor doet-: tl1c fact that Nevada and ldaho are awaiting a determination of these cases before proecc<ling to
onforee their local taxing statutes have any weight
either for or against tlte contention taken by counsel in
this case. lt is true that both ,Judge Bronson and ,Judge
Henderson of the District Court decided thPse caseR
adversely to the appellants, but in every case before
the Supreme Court tlte appellant is the one who lost
the case in the court below. The opinions of those two
judges are in the record on appeal. There should be little
comfort to opposing counsel in attempting to persuade
the Supreme Court that it is in error because it did
not follow the District Court in these cases.
Errors claimed in the Present Opinions:
Counsel take exception to the statement contained
m the court's opinion that "metals are not paid for
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under settlement contracts unless such metals are sold".
We reaffirm that such a statement is correct in the light
of the record in these cases; that all ores on which
premium payments were applied for by the producer
actually were "produced and delivered for sale"; and
that no ore which remained on the dmpp or in the
mine waf-: considered as a basis for payment of premium:::. Tt is, thc·refore, not true that in some cases the
,)n~;-; were never sold on which premium payments were
made. 'l'lw ~tipulation contained in Schedule "A" illustrah~s this point when it states that in certain instances
prelllium p<l}lllents W<'Te made in advanee of the sale
and in other instances subsequent to the sale. Premium
pa) rnenh< were a part of the price structure surrounding
the prndndion and sale of the ores in question.
Nor do \Ve agree, as con tended hy counsel on page
>)4 of their brifJ that the effect of the present decision

is to rewritr) the occupation tax statute. 'Jlhe construction
given to the taxing statutes by this court in its respective
opinions gives the only logical and reasonable construction that <·an he made.

By way of conclusion, Amici Curjae desire this
court to give an opportunity for "full re-argument" of
the eases. Not only have we had the cases before this
(·onrt, we havr also had two sets of cases before the
F'ederal eonrts. While some counsel have been involved
in the cases hcfore this court, otJ1er counsel have been
involvr1l in the cases before the Federal courts. The
mining companies had a full opportunity to consolidate
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all of the cases and appear in the State courts.· Some
of the companiek refused to do this and conunenced
their actions in the Federal District court. They have
had full opportunity to be heard both there and in the
Circuit Court of Appeals (and in two cases in the
Supreme Court of the United States). The balance of
the mining companies have had full opportunity to be
heard in the State District court and in the Supreme
Court. We see no reason for granting any re-argument
of these cases. There is nothing in the court's opinion
which does not show a careful and full consideration of
all of the issues involved and a determination in accordance with the more logical interpretation of the taxing
statutes.
Apparently Amici Curiae feel ''that the basic error
into which the court's opinions have fallen is to fail
to recognize that these cases turn fundamentally on the
construction of a Federal statute, and not on the construction of a press release." We submit that the
Federal Court has determined that the issue involved
here is one of construction of a local taxing statute.
That alone should be sufficient on which to deny the
petitions for rehearing. The court's opinion is based
upon the stipula:t:ed facts. True, some of those facts
appear from press releases but opposing counsel stipulated that the press releases contained the facts and
therefore should have no quarrel with this court in
accepting such statements as the fact. The portions of
the Stipulation of Facts marked Schedule "A" which
are not admitted to be facts by the respective parties are :
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The opinion of the Attorney General holding
the premium payments to be properly included as a
part of the proceeds from the various ores extracted
(see pages 34-39) ;
1.

2. 'fhe memorandum submitted by the mining companies to Charles B. Henderson, Pre::~ident of Metals
Reserve Company and his reply in response thereto
(see pages 25-30).
We have not attempted to persuade this court that
its opinion was correct because it followed the theory
of the Attorney General of the State of Utah who by
law is required to interpret the statutes for the benefit
of the mxecutive Branch of the Government; but certainly he should be in a much better position to interpret
those statutE~s than Charles B. Henderson of Metals
Reserve Company on whose opinion Amici Curiae heavily
rely.
Too, in enumerating the various agencies and courts
which had passed upon the question, opposing counsel
also failed to mention that our State Tax Commission,
after full hearing and argument of all counsel for the
mining companies as well as counsel for the State of
Utah, determined the issues adversely to the mining
companies ~md assessed the taxes which are now upheld
by this court's decisions.
CONCLUSION
From what has been stated herein, as well as in
previous hriefs filed by appellants, we respeetfully sub-
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mit that the decisions of this court should be sustained
and a re-hearing of the several cases denied. The
various causes have been argued thoroughly before each
of the several tribunals in which they have been presented. Numerous briefs have been filed and lengthy
oral arguments presented not only in this court but
in other courts. There has been no matter presented
in the petitions for re-hearing which was not thoroughly
considered by the court an<l disposed of by the opinions
rendered. No purpose could be served in granting a
re-hearing in these cases, except to give tht~ respondents
another opportunity to argue the same points and matters heretofore presented.
We earnestly request the Supreme Court to deny
the petitions for re-hearing.
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